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THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC VALUATION PROCEDURE
IN REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT
The Michigan Supreme Court has recently decided a case which
emphasizes the need for the adoption of scientific valuation procedures
in real property tax assessment.1 The city commission of the city of
Battle Creek, Michigan, determined that a revaluation and reappraisal
for assessment purposes of the property of the city should be made.
Pursuant to this determination, a contract was entered into by the
city with an appraisal company of Dayton, Ohio, providing for a
complete reappraisal and revaluation of all property in the city, to be
developed according to scientific rules, and compiled in a form easily
kept current. The appraisal company was to make the expert investigation and furnish the assessor with the necessary expert information
and records. Four employees of the appraisal company were subsequently appointed as assistant assessors without salary in order to
facilitate obtaining the necessary information. The contract provided
that the city assessor was to act and serve as appraiser-in-chief, and
he was to make final decisions as to valuations, procedures and forms
used in revaluation. John Conroy, a resident taxpayer, sought to have
the contract set aside as ultra vires, illegal, and as an unlawful usurpation of the powers of the city not permitted by law. The court held
that the contract was not ultra vires nor invalid as an unlawful delegation of power.
This case raises the question whether or not such a contract would
be sustained in those states where the courts have stringently applied
the "market value" rule in determining the valuation of property for
taxation purposes. 2 Wisconsin, for example, in the Hennessey case,
adheres to the doctrine that real estate must be assessed for the
purpose of taxation at its fair market value, and it defines market
value as the price for which property will sell after negotiations between an owner willing but not obligated to sell, and a willing buyer
not obligated to buy. This rule has been the interpretation placed on a
statute which is a common one on the statute books of most states.4
Those states which place a strict construction upon these statutes, and
I Conroy v. City of Battle Creek, 22 N.W. 2d 275 (Mich. 1946).
2 Luce, "Assessment of Real Property for Taxation," 35 Mich. L.R. 1217 at p.
1238 (1937): "It must be remembered that although practical tax administration has been forced to depart from market value as a guide in tax valuation
and to adopt the procedure outlined above (scientific methods of valuation, inproperty for taxation. Authbrs Note) most statutes and constitutions, interpreted in the light of their history, still require that all property be assessed
uniforrly upon the basis of market value."
3 State ex. rel. Hennessey v. Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 548, 6 N.W. 2d 718 (1942).
4 See Sec. 70.32 Wis. Stats., which reads as follows :". . . Real property shall
be valued by the assessor from actual view or from the best information that
the assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value which could be obtained
therefor at private sale ...
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Wisconsin and Pennsylvania seem typical, tend to frown upon the use
of scientific formulas or equations in determining valuation for assessment purposes. The attitude of these courts can be illustrated by a
statement of the Pennsylvania Court in Vollmer v. City of Philadelphia,5 upholding its position that values determined by the use of
scientific methods are not acceptable in that state. The court stated:
"If fixing assessments were only a problem in mathematics
or an exercise to demonstrate a theory, it might be that the
arguments of the representatives of the city could prevail, but
the question is one of taxation, and 'taxation is a practical not
a scientific problem'."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has expressed similar objection to
scientific procedure in the Park Falls Lumber Co. case, and others.6
It has been criticized for its stringent interpretation of its statute,
and its disapproval of methods which are asserted to be more equitable
and workable as modern standards for assessment of property for
taxation. 7
But despite its seemingly strict construction of the statutory term
"market value," the Wisconsin Court has in some cases indicated
its willingness to consider factors used in so-called scientific valuation
schemes. In the case of State ex. rel, Gishold Machine Co. v.
Norsman,8 where an assessor applied a front-foot value rule, and
diminished values in rough proportion to the increase of distance from
a starting point, the assessor was commended by the Court for being
awake and responsive to other factors involved. The problem is
discussed at length in regard to the attitude of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in an article in the Wisconsin Law Review. 9
5350 Pa. 223, 38 A. 2d. 266 at 269 (1930). See also Harleigh Realty Co. Case,
299 Pa. 384, 387, 149 A. 653, 654: "We learn from the record that in making
up its assessment the city called to its aid an appraisal company, which made
certain calculations in accordance with formulas adopted by it. Each calculation was based on the value of a basic unit of ground 100 feet in depth by one
foot in breadth. It would be surprising to learn that any property in the city
had ever been actually bought and sold on such a basis." Kemble's Estate,
280 Pa. 441, 445, 124 A. 694, 695 (1924): "Scientific formulae, arithmetical
deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments
under our practical system of taxation. The market value of the separate tracts
at public sale, after due notice, is the legal basis recognized by our statutes, of
determining the assessable value of real estate, and until the Legislature
changes this method, it is binding not only upon the taxing authorities but upon
the courts as well."
6 Park Falls Lumber Co. v. American Appraisal Co., 189 Wis. 239, 207 N.W.
300 (1926); Hersey v. Board of Supervisors of Barron County, 37 Wis. 75

(1875).

7 Bonbright, "Valuation of Real Estate for Tax Purposes," 34 Col. L.R. 1397

(1934); Hughes & Schienbrood, "Taxation-Valuation of Real Estate in
Wisconsin," 12 Wis. L.R. 540 (1935).
s State ex rel Gisholt Machine Co. v. Norsman, 168 Wis. 442, 169 N.W. 429
(1919).
Hughes & Schienbrood, "Taxation-Valuation of Real Estate in Wisconsin,"
12 Wis. L.R. 540. (1935).
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Several courts in recent years have indicated that they will allow
an assessor to consider such factors as original cost less depreciation,
capitalization of income, absolesence, insurance carried, future trends,
book value, and others.'" This is particularly true in cases where the
property is not readily salable. But even in those courts .which do
not approve of the use of the factors mentioned, where the assessor
has employed experts, or has himself used scientific formulas or equations, there has been a tendency to accept the assessor's valuation as
prima facie correct."1 For example, in 1928 in the City of Chicago,
the reassessment of that year was conducted under the supervision
of a high-salaried valuation engineer, and with the advice of financial
experts from the universities, and the real estate organizations of the
city. It was made in accordance with plans and specifications evolved
by scientific tax experts. The Revenue Act of the state provided:
"Real property shall be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale in
the course of trade, which shall be set down in one column to be
headed 'full value', and said full value shall be set down in
another column headed 'assessed value'."
The taxpayer, whose property had been thus reassessed, resisted a
suit by the city to have the property sold for delinquent taxes, on
the ground that the reassessment procedure violated statutory requirements. While the court did not approve of the methods used,
and recognized that the statute was not followed, it passed the matter
by saying that there was no evidence to show that the valuation
placed upon the objector's real estate in the 1928 reassessment was
too high as compared to other properties in the state. 2
In the principal case, the court recognized the need for better
methods in the valuation of real estate for taxation purposes. While
the norm of "market value", "sale value", "fair cash value", and others
of similar connotation, may be workable where small communities or
agricultural lands are concerned, they tend to break down when applied
20 State ex rel Northwestern M.L. Ins. Co. v. Weiher, 177 Wis. 445, 188 N.W.
598 (1922) ; State ex rel Flambeau P. Co. v. Windus, 208 Wis. 583, 243 N.W.
516 (1932); Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 AtI. 184, 95 A.L.R.
434 (1934).

11 Hughes & Schienbrood, "Taxation-Valuation of Real Estate in Wisconsin,"
12 Wis. L.R. 540 (1935) at p. 541, referring to the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
"In its attempt the court has gained a reputation for stringently applying the
'market value' rule. To appreciate the rigid application which has been made
at times it should be remembered that 'the 'assessor's valuation is prima facie
correct, and will not be set aside in the absence of evidence showing it to be
incorrect.' Nevertheless, the court has several times upset assessments for failure to comply strictly with the 'market value' rule."

See also Worthington Pump and Machine Corp. v. City of Cudahy, 205
Wis. 227, 229, 237 N.W., 140 141 (1931).
12 People ex rel McDonough v. Cesar, 349 Ill. 372, 182 N.E. 448 (1932), cert.
den. 288 U.S. 603.
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to properties in urban areas.1" This has been particularly true of
property infrequently sold. The Michigan Court took a realistic stand
when it stated:
"It might be said at the outset that the valuation and appraisal of urban properties has become almost an engineering
science in itself. The duty of a township supervisor in making
an assessment as a rule was comparatively simple. It was not
difficult to assess farm lands or those of villages and small
cities. The correct value of the land could be easily ascertained.
The market value could be readily obtained from recent sales
and there was no difficulty in making a rather complete and
fairly accurate valuation, appraisal and assessment. However,
with the growth of cities, valuations became more complicated
and a branch of engineering science gradually developed so
that it required some engineering science as well as an understanding of the factors entering into an appraisal in order to
determine correct values . . . The valuation of real estate and
improvements has always been difficult and present many problems, and even with the applied science for valuation and appraisal, the true value cannot be obtained with mathematical
exactitude, but by the application of these modern rules, a much
fairer degree of accuracy is arrived at than existed theretofore."
Whether those courts which still apply a strict construction of market value will ever give outspoken approval to the demand for a
more liberal construction is doubtful. 14 After all, the legislature bears
primary responsibility for the continuance of statutory rules which
have received strict construction in the past. Without much question,
legislative change will receive judicial approval. For instance, the
Charter of the City of Santa Barbara, California provides for a scientific appraisal of the real estate of that city every five years, and the
validity of this provision in the Charter was upheld by the Supreme
Court of that state.'"
It will be noted in the principal case that the court is very explicit
as to the fact that the contract with the appraisal company provided
that the city assessor should have "the last word and final decision,
although assisted by experts." The cases have uniformly held that the
Luce, "Assessment of Real Property for Taxation," 35 Mich. L.R. 1217 at 1219,
1220 (1937): "Widespread complaint concerning the lack of equity in present day property taxation indicates that no satisfactory solution of the problem has been as yet worked out ... For a time, ... the sale or market value
of property furnished an easily applied process of valuation which was peculiarly applicable, under economic conditions then existing, to the equitable
determination of taxable value. But changing economic conditions have destroyed its usefulness as a basis for assessment."
14 A few courts have largely discarded the statutory mandate of market value,
holding that the market value norm must be read in conjunction with the
uniforrmitv clause. City of Roanoke v. Gibson, 161 Va. 342, 347, 170 S.E.
13

723 (1933).
15 Storke v. City of Santa Barbara, 76 Cal. App. 40, 244 P. 158 (1926).
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assessor must exercise independent judgment and not accept the valuation of the expert blindly and servilely." The reason usually given
has been that the assessor exercises quasi-judicial powers and such
powers cannot be delegatedY In practice, it would seem that his
exercise of independent judgment is, in most cases, a mere formality,
for it is reasonably certain that one who has a complete set of
valuation figures before him, compiled by an expert in the appraisal
of real estate, is not strongly inclined, as a general rule, to exercise
any serious "independent judgment" to change the valuations set.
The exercise of such "judgment" is likely to be an idle gesture, so
long as the assessor admits that the scientific appraisal is more accurate and uniform than his guess.1 8 There can be no doubt that the
courts will denounce any outright delegation of the assessor's power,
but they will probably go a long way to support the presumption that
he exercised independent judgment. A good example of this is found
in the case of Clare v. Curran9 where the City of Central Falls, Rhode
Island, hired experts to appraise the real estate of that city. The
court sustained the city in hiring experts, and in discussing the question
of whether or not the power of the assessor had been delegated, as
contended by the taxpayer, the court admitted there was evidence
that the assessors merely copied the values from cards submitted by
the appraisers, but stated that it could not draw the inference that
the assessors did not exercise independent judgment where the experts
and assistants were at all times under the "direct supervision and control of the board of assessors . . ."
It is clear that there are some states which are beginning to recognize the need for better methods of appraisal of real estate for taxation
purposes. The Michigan Supreme Court, in the case discussed, has
clearly indicated that it will through judicial interpretation, assist by
recognizing such methods. But decisions such as this can never afford
a complete remedy. True reform and clear recognition of the socalled scientific methods in any state can come in most situations only
through legislative revision of assessment bases and theory.
JOHN

J. DONAHUE

1 See collection of authorities in 107 A.L.R. 1477, 1482 (1937); Crowell &

Spencer Lumber Co. v. Lafleur, 137 La. 772, 776, 69 S. 170 (1915) ; Clare v.
Curran, 52 R.I. 196, 159 A. 835 (1932) ; Federal Royalty Co. v. State, 42 S.W.
0
2d. 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
1C
Glare v. Curran, 52 R.I. 196, 159 A. 835 at p. 836 (1932) : "The proceedings
for assessing a tax are quasi-judicial, and no one would suggest that a board
of assessors can delegate its authority, but assessors have the right, and it is
often the duty, to obtain the assistance of experts in arriving at the value of
certain classes of property."
ISBonbright, "Valuation of Real Estate for Tax Purposes," 34 Col. L.R. 1397
at p. 1422 (1934), in comparing the use of scientific methods with the practice
of the assessor in determining the sale value, states that the former methods,
though not mathematically accurate, are "superior to the assessor's guess which
is an intuitive conclusion from a more limited experience."
19 Clare v. Curran, 52 R.I. 196, 159 A. 835 (1932).

